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Abstract
Modern networks assemble an ever growing number of nodes. However, it remains
difficult to increase the number of channels per node, thus the maximal degree of the
network may be bounded. This is typically the case in grid topology networks, where
each node has at most four neighbors. In this paper, we address the following issue: if
each node is likely to fail in an unpredictable manner, how can we preserve some global
reliability guarantees when the number of nodes keeps increasing unboundedly ?
To be more specific, we consider the problem or reliably broadcasting information
on an asynchronous grid in the presence of Byzantine failures – that is, some nodes
may have an arbitrary and potentially malicious behavior. Our requirement is that
a constant fraction of correct nodes remain able to achieve reliable communication.
Existing solutions can only tolerate a fixed number of Byzantine failures if they adopt
a worst-case placement scheme. Besides, if we assume a constant Byzantine ratio
(each node has the same probability to be Byzantine), the probability to have a fatal
placement approaches 1 when the number of nodes increases, and reliability guarantees
collapse.
In this paper, we propose the first broadcast protocol that overcomes these diffi-
culties. First, the number of Byzantine failures that can be tolerated (if they adopt
the worst-case placement) now increases with the number of nodes. Second, we are
able to tolerate a constant Byzantine ratio, however large the grid may be. In other
words, the grid becomes scalable. This result has important security applications in
ultra-large networks, where each node has a given probability to misbehave.
Keywords: Byzantine failures, Networks, Broadcast, Fault tolerance, Distributed
computing, Protocol, Random failures
1 Introduction
As modern networks grow larger and larger, their components become more likely to fail.
Indeed, some nodes can be subject to crashes, attacks, bit flips, etc. Many models of failures
and attacks have been studied so far, but the most general one is the Byzantine model [11]:
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the failing nodes behave arbitrarily. In other words, we must anticipate the most malicious
strategy they could adopt. This encompasses all other possible types of failures, and has
important security applications.
In this paper, we study the problem of reliably broadcasting information in a network
despite the presence of Byzantine failures. This is a difficult problem, as a single Byzantine
node, if not neutralized, can potentially lie to the entire network. Our objective is to design
a broadcast protocol that prevent or limit the diffusion of malicious messages.
Related works. Many Byzantine-robust protocols are based on cryptography [3, 5]: the
nodes use digital signatures or certificates. Therefore, the correct nodes can verify the
validity of received informations and authenticate the sender across multiple hops. However,
this approach may not be as general as we want, as the malicious nodes are supposed to ignore
some cryptographic secrets: therefore, their behavior is not completely arbitrary. Besides,
cryptographic operations require the presence of a trusted infrastructure that deals with
public and private keys: if this infrastructure fails, the whole network fails. Yet, we would
like to consider that any component can fail. For these reasons, we focus on cryptography-
free solutions.
Cryptography-free solutions have first been studied in completely connected networks [11,
1, 12, 13, 17]: a node can directly communicate with any other node, which implies the pres-
ence of a channel between each pair of nodes. Therefore, these approaches are hardly scalable,
as the number of channels per node can be physically limited. We thus study solutions in
multihop networks, where a node must rely on other nodes to broadcast informations.
A notable class of algorithms tolerates Byzantine failures with either space [15, 18, 21]
or time [14, 9, 8, 7, 6] locality. Yet, the emphasis of space local algorithms is on containing
the fault as close to its source as possible. This is only applicable to the problems where
the information from remote nodes is unimportant (such as vertex coloring, link coloring
or dining philosophers). Also, time local algorithms presented so far can hold at most one
Byzantine node and are not able to mask the effect of Byzantine actions. Thus, the local
containment approach is not applicable to reliable broadcast.
It has been shown that, for agreement in the presence of up to k Byzantine nodes, it is
necessary and sufficient that the network is (2k+1)-connected, and that the number of nodes
in the system is at least 3k + 1 [4]. Also, this solution assumes that the topology is known
to every node, and that nodes are scheduled according to the synchronous execution model.
Both requirements have been relaxed [19]: the topology is unknown and the scheduling is
asynchronous. Yet, this solution retains 2k+ 1 connectivity for reliable broadcast and k+ 1
connectivity for detection (the nodes are aware of the presence of a Byzantine failure). In
sparse networks such as a grid (where a node has at most four neighbors), both approaches
can cope only with a single Byzantine node, independently of the size of the grid.
Another existing approach is based, not on connectivity, but on the fraction of Byzantine
neighbors per node. Broadcast protocols have been proposed for nodes organized on a grid
[10, 2]. However, the wireless medium typically induces much more than four neighbors per
node, otherwise the broadcast does not work. Both approaches are based on a local voting
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system, and perform correctly if every node has strictly less than a 1/4 fraction of Byzantine
neighbors. This result was later generalized to other topologies [20], assuming that each
node knows the global topology. Again, in weakly connected networks, this constraint on
the proportion of Byzantine nodes in any neighborhood may be difficult to assess.
All aforementioned results rely on strong connectivity and Byzantine proportions as-
sumptions in the network. In other words, tolerating more Byzantine failures requires to
increase the number of channels per node, which may be difficult or impossible when the
size of the network increases. To overcome this difficulty, an alternate approach has been
proposed [16]. The idea is to make a small concession to the problem: we now aim at reliable
communication, not between all correct nodes, but between most correct nodes. In other
words, we now accept that a small minority of correct nodes can be fooled by the Byzantine
nodes. This is not unrealistic, as we already accepted the idea that some nodes can fail un-
predictably (being hit by Byzantine failures). This approach has been shown very efficient
when the Byzantine failures are randomly distributed. This is the case, for instance, in a
peer-to-peer overlay (the malicious nodes do not choose their localization when they join the
overlay), or if we consider that each node has a given probability of failure.
All existing approaches have the same weak point: if the number of channels per node
(degree) is bounded, a fixed number of Byzantine nodes can destabilize the whole network.
Indeed, if they adopt a sufficiently close formation, they can pretend to be the source node,
and lie to any other node – thus, we cannot even ensure that most correct nodes communicate
reliably. Besides, if each node has a given probability to be Byzantine, the probability that
such a fatal formation exists approaches 1 when the number of nodes increases. Therefore,
these approaches are hardly scalable when the maximal degree is bounded.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose the first broadcast protocol that overcomes
these difficulties on a specific degree-bounded topology: the grid, where each node has at
most four neighbors. For this protocol, the diameter of the grid can only have discrete
values, but can be as large as we want. As in [16], our requirement is that a constant
fraction of correct nodes achieves reliable communication. We show that the number of
Byzantine failures that can be tolerated (if they adopt the worst-case placement) increases
with the number of nodes: in other words, for the first time, this number is not limited by
the maximal degree or the connectivity of the network. Besides, if we assume a constant rate
of Byzantine failures (each node has the same probability to be Byzantine), the expected
reliable fraction of the network is always the same, however large the grid may be. This may
have applications in large-scale networks, where each node has a given probability to fail: we
can now increase the size of the network indefinitely, and yet preserve the same reliability
guarantees.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the network topology (a
sequence of grid networks that may be as large as we want) and the broadcast protocol to
execute on it. In Section 3, we adopt the point of view of an omniscient observer that knows
the positions of Byzantine nodes, and give a methodology to determine a reliable node set -
that is, a set of nodes that always communicate reliably, in any possible execution. At last,
3
in Section 4, we use the aforementioned methodology to prove the claims.
2 Our algorithm
In this section, we define a class of grid networks and the broadcast protocol to execute on.
2.1 Hypotheses
The network is constituted by a set of processes, called nodes. Some pairs of nodes are linked
by a communication channel – we call them neighbors – and can exchange messages. Each
node of the network has a unique identifier, which is its position on the grid. A node, upon
receiving a message from a neighbor, knows the identifier of this neighbor. The network is
asynchronous: any message sent is eventually received, but it can be at any time.
2.2 Network topology
Let N = 10. Our broadcast protocol is defined for the networks Gk, ∀k ≥ 1, Gk being a
Nk ×Nk grid. These networks may be as large as needed.
Definition 1 (Grid network) An M ×M grid is a network such that:
• Each node has a unique identifier (i, j) with 0 ≤ i < M and 0 ≤ j < M .
• Two nodes (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) are neighbors if and only if one of these two conditions
is satisfied:
– i1 = i2 and |j1 − j2| = 1.
– j1 = j2 and |i1 − i2| = 1.
According to our hypotheses, each node knows its identifier (i, j) on the grid, and the
identifier (i, j) of its neighbors. Each node of Gk also knows N and k.
2.3 Informal description of the protocol
Our broadcast protocol (BP) is defined by induction: we use an existing BP on G1, then use
the BP of Gk to define the BP of Gk+1. The idea is to associate a cluster of Gk+1 to each
node of Gk. Let G(p) be the cluster associated to a node p (we call it macro-node). This is
illustrated in Figure 1. The goal of a macro-node G(p) is to simulate the behavior of p, so
that we obtain a macroscopic BP in Gk+1. Then, when a node u of G(p) wants to broadcast
a message m in Gk+1:
1. First, u broadcasts m in G(p) with a local BP.
2. Then, G(p) broadcasts m in Gk+1 with the macroscopic BP.
The interest of this inductive definition lies in its Byzantine-resilience properties. These
properties are studied in Section 3.
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Figure 1: Association of a macro-node of Gk+1 to each node of Gk
2.4 Complete description of the protocol
The BP executed on G1 is the Control Zone Protocol (CZP) proposed in [16]. Let us give
the methodology to construct the BP of Gk+1 with the BP of Gk. For this purpose, we first
give an algorithm to communicate between two macro-nodes (macro-channel), then use it
to construct the macroscopic BP.
Macro-node. To each node p of Gk, we associate a cluster G(p) of Gk+1, called macro-
node. Let (i, j) be the identifier of p. Then, G(p) is the N ×N grid such that the node (0, 0)
of G(p) corresponds to the node (Ni,Nj) of Gk+1.
Macro-channel. Let p and q be two neighbor nodes in Gk. We give an algorithm to
tranfer messages from G(p) to G(q), as if they were two neighbor nodes linked by a channel.
First, we execute the CZP on both G(p) and G(q), to enable local broadcast inside each
macro-node. The following algorithm enables to send a message m, known by the nodes of
G(p), to the nodes of G(q). Let Border(p) (resp. Border(q)) be the set of nodes of G(p)
(resp. G(q)) having a neighbor in G(q) (resp. G(p)).
1. The nodes of Border(p) send m to their neighbor in Border(q).
2. The nodes of Border(q), upon receiving m from their neighbor in Border(q), broadcast
m in G(q) with the CZP .
3. The nodes of G(q), upon receiving strictly more than N/2 distinct messages (vi,m)
trough the CZP with vi ∈ Border(q), accept m.
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Figure 2: Principle of the protocol
We associate a dynamic set Senq to each node of G(p) (storing the message to send), and
a dynamic set Recp to each node of G(q) (storing the messages received). We execute this
algorithm for each pair of neighbor macro-nodes. This mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2.
Macroscopic BP. For each node p of Gk, all nodes of G(p) execute the same algorithm
than p, with the two following modifications:
1. When the algorithm requires to send a message m to a neighbor q, add m to Senq.
2. When a message m is added to the set Recq, consider that m was received from q.
Now, let s be a node of G(p) that wants to broadcast a message m in Gk+1. First, s
broadcasts (s,m) in G(p) with the CZP. Then, upon receiving (s,m), the nodes of G(p)
broadcast (s,m) with the macroscopic BP . Thus, the nodes receiving (s,m) know that s
broadcast m: we now have a BP on Gk+1.
3 Construction of a reliable node set
In this section, we now assume that some nodes are Byzantine, and behave arbitrarily instead
of following the aforementioned protocol. We adopt the point of view of an omniscient
external observer, knowing the positions of Byzantine nodes, and give a methodology to
determine a reliable node set - that is, a set of nodes that communicate reliably in any
possible execution. This methodology is used in Section 4 to prove the claims. Notice that
we never require that a node determines such a set: this is just a global view of the system.
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Notion of reliable node set. The nodes following the aforementioned protocol are called
correct. The correct nodes do not know the positions of Byzantine nodes.
Definition 2 (Reliable node set) For a given broadcast protocol (BP), a set of correct
nodes is reliable if, for each pair of nodes s and r of this set:
1. If s broadcasts m, r eventually accepts (s,m).
2. If r accepts (s,m), r necessarily broadcast m.
In other words, a reliable node set behaves like a network without Byzantine failures. The
item (1) guarantees that the nodes always manage to communicate. The item (2) guarantees
that no node of the reliable set can be fooled - for instance, if a Byzantine node broadcasts
(s,m′) to make the network believe that s broadcast m′.
Construction of a reliable node set. Let Corr be a set of correct nodes of Gk. Let us
define a function Relk such that Relk(Corr) returns a reliable node set for our BP. For this
purpose, we first introduce some new elements.
In [16], we gave a methodology to determine a reliable node set for the CZP on an
N × N grid, for a given set Corr0 of correct nodes. Let RelCZP be a function such that
RelCZP (Corr0) returns a reliable node set for the CZP.
At last, we introduce the notion of correct macro-node. In broad outline, a correct macro-
node behaves like a correct node in the macroscopic BP. This intuitive idea is the key element
of the next theorem.
Definition 3 (Correct macro-node) Let there be an N×N grid with a distribution Corr0
of correct nodes. This grid (or macro-node) is said correct if each side of the grid (up, down,
right and left), among its N nodes, has strictly more than 3N/4 nodes in RelCZP (Corr0).
The underlying idea of this definition is the following: the reliable node sets of two
adjacent correct macro-nodes are always connected by a majority of channels (strictly more
than N/2). Therefore, the messages exchanged between these two reliable sets always receive
a majority of votes. This idea is illustrated in Figure 3, and used in the proof below.
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Figure 3: Reliable communication between 2 correct macro-nodes
We can now define the function Relk by induction, ∀k ≥ 1:
• Rel1 = RelCZP
• Relk+1(Corr) =
⋃
p∈Relk(Corr′)RelCZP (Corr(p)), where . . .
– Corr is a distribution of correct nodes on Gk+1.
– Corr(p) is the corresponding distribution on G(p).
– Corr′ is the set of nodes p of Gk such that G(p) is a correct macro-node.
In the following, we refer to RelCZP (Corr(x)) by Rel(x).
Theorem 1 ∀k ≥ 1, if Corr is a distribution of correct nodes on Gk, then Relk(Corr) is a
reliable node set for our BP.
Proof: The main idea of the proof is to show an equivalence between the execution on Gk+1
and a virtual execution on Gk (this, of course, does not mean that Gk must actually exist
for Gk+1 to work).
The proof is by induction. The property is true at rank 1 by definition. Now, let us
suppose that the property is true at rank k, and show that it is true at rank k+ 1. Let Corr
be a distribution of correct nodes on Gk+1, and let s and r be two nodes of Relk+1(Corr).
Let us suppose that s broadcasts m in Gk+1. Then, to show that Relk+1(Corr) is a reliable
node set, we show that the items (1) and (2) of Definition 2 are satisfied.
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1. We call accumulative a distributed algorithm where each node holds a given number
of dynamic sets S1, S2, S3 . . ., can only add elements to these sets (Si ← Si ∪ {x}),
and eventually executes an action when a given collection of elements has joined these
sets: (X1 ⊆ S1) ∧ (X2 ⊆ S2) ∧ . . .. The CZP is accumulative, and so is our BP, as it
is an inductive combination of accumulative algorithms. In other words, the order of
reception of messages is unimportant in our BP.
Let p and q be the nodes of Gk such that s belongs to G(p) and r belongs to G(q).
By definition of Relk+1, p and q belong to Relk(Corr
′). Let us suppose that Corr′ is
a distribution of correct nodes on Gk. Then, Relk(Corr
′) is a reliable node set on Gk.
Therefore, if p broadcasts (s,m), there exists a sequence of message receptions such
that q eventually accepts (s,m). Let (R1, R2, . . . , RM) be this sequence, Ri being a
triplet (qi,mi, pi) such that qi receives mi from pi, with p1 = p and qM = q. Let us
prove the following property Pi by induction, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}: all the nodes of Rel(qi)
eventually add mi to Recpi .
• First, let us show that P1 is true. According to our BP, s initially broadcasts
(s,m) in G(p). Therefore, as p = p1, all the nodes of Rel(p1) eventually accept
(s,m). Then, as they execute the same alogorithm than p1, they add m1 to their
set Senq1 .
Let Border(q1) be the set of nodes of G(q1) having a neighbor in G(p1). As G(q1)
and G(p1) are two correct macro-nodes, according to Definition 3, strictly more
than N/2 nodes of Rel(p1) have a neighbor in Rel(q1). Therefore, strictly more
than N/2 nodes of Border(q1) ∩ Rel(q1) eventually receive m1, and broadcast it
in G(q1). So all the nodes of Rel(q1) eventually receive strictly more than N/2
messages (vx,m1) with vx ∈ Border(q1) and add m1 to Recp1 . Thus, P1 is true.
• Now, let us suppose that Pj is true ∀j ≤ i. Then, as the order of reception of
messages is unimportant, all the nodes of Rel(pi+1) eventually behave as pi+1, and
add mi+1 to Senqi+1 .
Thus, by a perfectly similar demonstration, Pi+1 is true.
Then , as r ∈ Rel(q), according to PM : r eventually receives the same messages as
q = qM and accepts (s,m). Thus, the item (1) of Definition 2 is satisfied. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.
2. The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose the opposite: r accepts a message (s,m),
yet s did not broadcast m. Let p0 be the node of Gk such that r ∈ Rel(p0). If we
also have s ∈ Rel(p0), it is impossible that r accepts (s,m), as Rel(p0) is a reliable
node set. So s necessarily belongs to another macro-node. Similarly than above, let
us suppose that Corr′ is a distribution of correct nodes on Gk. Then, as Relk(Corr′)
is a reliable node set on Gk, r necessarily received a message that p0 cannot receive in
Gk. Let us show that this is impossible.
Let u be the first node of Relk+1(Corr) (possibly r), belonging to a macro-node G(q),
to receive a message m′ that q cannot receive in Gk. Let G(p) be the macro-node
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Figure 4: Illustration of the proof (1) : what occurs in Relk(Corr
′) eventually occurs in
Relk+1(Corr)
sending this message. If G(p) is not correct (in the sense of Definition 3), then p does
not belong to Corr′, is assumed to be Byzantine on Gk, and can actually send m′ to
q – so G(p) is necessarily correct. It implies that u received strictly more than N/2
messages (vi,m
′) with vi ∈ Border(q). As G(p) and G(q) are two correct macro-node,
strictly more than N/2 nodes of Rel(p) have a neighbor in Rel(q). So at least one
of the nodes vi belongs to Rel(q) and received m
′ from a neighbor v ∈ Rel(p). As
Rel(p) is a reliable node set, the only possibility is that v received a message that p
cannot receive in Gk. So u is not the first node in this situation, which contradicts the
initial statement. Thus, the item (2) of Definition 2 is satisfied. This is illustrated in
Figure 5.
2
We now have a methodology to determine a reliable node set for a given distribution of
Byzantine nodes on Gk, ∀k ≥ 1. In the next section, we use this methodology to prove the
claims.
4 Proof of the claims
In this section, we finally prove the claims of the paper: the number of Byzantine failures
that can be tolerated increases with the number of nodes (if they adopt the worst-case
10
Figure 5: Illustration of the proof (2) : a node of Relk+1(Corr) cannot misbehave
placement), and a constant rate of Byzantine failures can be tolerated, however large the
grid may be. As in [16], our requirement to tolerate Byzantine failures is that a constant
fraction of the network communicates reliably.
4.1 Worst-case placement
Let us give a minimal number of Byzantine failures that can be tolerated when they adopt
an arbitrary placement (possibly the worst).
Theorem 2 ∀k ≥ 1, on a grid Gk with at most 2k−1 Byzantine failures (arbitrarily placed),
the fraction of the network achieving reliable communication is at least 1− 4
N2
.
Proof: The proof is by induction. For k = 1, we can test all possible placements of a single
Byzantine failure (as N = 10) and show that the property is true. Now, let us suppose that
the property is true at rank k. Let there be 2k Byzantine failures arbitrarily placed on Gk+1.
Then, at most 2k−1 macro-nodes of Gk+1 contain more than 2 Byzantine failures. Again,
by testing all possible cases, we can show that an N × N grid with at most 1 Byzantine
failure is always correct in the sense of Definition 3. So at most 2k−1 macro-nodes are not
correct. Therefore, as the property is true at rank k, the reliable node set covers at least
a 1 − 4
N2
fraction of macro-nodes (and in this worst case, all these macro-nodes have only
correct nodes). Thus, according to the definition of Relk+1, the property is true at rank
k + 1. This is illustrated in Figure 6.
2
11
Figure 6: Worst-case placement of 2k−1 Byzantine nodes on Gk
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So we can always tolerate 2k−1 failures on Gk. As the parameter k sets the size of the
grid, this number increases with the number of nodes. To our knowledge, this is the first time
that this number is not limited by the connectivity or the maximal degree of the network.
4.2 Random distribution
Let us assume a constant rate of Byzantine failures (each node has the same probability λ
to be Byzantine) and give the expected reliable fraction of the network. Let µ = 1 − λ be
the probability that a node is correct.
Theorem 3 ∀k ≥ 1, let Fk(µ) be the expected reliable fraction of Gk. Then, if µ ≥ 1−10−5,
we have Fk(µ) ≥ 1− 10−4.
Proof: Let there be an N × N grid where each node has the same probability µ0 to be
correct. We call P (µ0) the probability that the two following events occur:
1. The grid is correct in the sense of Definition 3.
2. A node, chosen uniformly at random, belongs to RelCZP (Corr0), Corr0 being the
distribution of correct nodes on the grid.
We want to prove the following property by induction: Fk ≥
i=k∏
i=1
P i(µ), P i being the ith
application of the function P . The property is true at rank 1, as F1(µ) ≥ P (µ).
Now, let us suppose that the property is true at rank k. Let Corr be the distribution
of correct nodes on Gk+1. Let u be a randomly chosen node of Gk+1, and let p be the
node of Gk such that u belongs to the macro-node G(p). According to Theorem 1, to have
u ∈ Relk+1(Corr), it is necessary and sufficient that (1) u ∈ Rel(p) and (2) p ∈ Relk(Corr′).
The first event occurs with probability P1 ≥ P (µ), and if so, the second event occurs with
probability P2 ≥ Fk(P (µ)). Thus, Fk+1(µ) ≥ P (µ)Fk(P (µ)) =
i=k+1∏
i=1
P i(µ): the property is
true at rank k + 1. This is illustrated in Figure 7.
Now, let us give a lower bound of P (µ0). We consider two disjoint cases:
1. The case where all the nodes of the N ×N grid are correct, which occurs with proba-
bility µN
2
0 . In this case, RelCZP (Corr0) covers the whole grid, and the grid is correct
in the sense of Definition 3.
2. The case where one single node is Byzantine, which occurs with probability N2(1 −
µ0)µ
N2−1
0 . As N = 10, we evaluate RelCZP (Corr0) for the 100 possible placements
of the single Byzantine node. In 64 cases, this set contains 99 nodes. In 32 cases,
it contains 98 nodes. In 4 cases, it contains 96 nodes. Thus, the probability that a
13
Figure 7: Sufficient condition for u to be in Relk+1(Corr)
Figure 8: Different cases for the placement of 1 Byzantine node on an N ×N grid
randomly chosen correct node belongs to this set is α =
64× 99 + 32× 98 + 4× 96
100× 99 ≥
199
200
. In all cases, the grid is correct in the sense of Definition 3. This is illustrated in
Figure 8.
So P (µ) ≥ g(µ) = µN2 + αN2(1 − µ)µN2−1. This function is convex
(
∂2g(µ)
∂µ2
≤ 0
)
for
µ ≥ α. Let β = 1 − 10−5 ≥ α. Then, ∀µ ≥ β, g(µ) ≥ f(γ, µ) = 1 − γ(1 − µ), with
γ =
1− g(β)
1− β . Then, we easily show by induction that ∀k ≥ 1, P
k(µ) ≥ f(γk, µ). So
Fk(µ) ≥ Hk(µ) =
i=k∏
i=1
f(γi, µ).
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We now have a lower bound of Fk(µ), but it may be hard to calculate when k approaches
infinity. To overcome this difficulty, let i0 be the first integer such that, ∀i ≥ i0, γi ≤ 1
i2
.
So Hk(µ) ≥
i=i0∏
i=1
f(γi, µ)
i=k∏
i=i0+1
(1 − 1− µ
i2
). Then, when k approaches infinity, we can apply
the Wallis formula: lim
x→∞
Hk(µ) ≥
i=i0∏
i=1
f(γi, µ)
sin(pi
√
1− µ)
pi
√
1− µ ≥ 1− 10
−4 if µ ≥ β. Thus, the
result, as Hk(µ) decreases with k. 2
Therefore, we can hold a constant rate of Byzantine failures and yet have a constant
expected fraction of reliable nodes, however large the grid may be. This may have important
security applications – for instance in a computationnal grid where each processor has a
given probability to misbehave. This result shows that, for a given security requirement, we
can increase the size of the grid indefinetely, which could be a solution to the problem of
scalability.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that Byzantine resilience was possible in a scalable degree-
bounded network. If the adversary can place the Byzantine nodes arbitrarily, then for the
first time, we can tolerate a number of Byzantine failures that largely exceeds the node
degree. If not (random distribution), then we can tolerate a constant fraction of Byzantine
nodes, even if the size of the network approaches infinity.
We have the strong conviction that this approach (slice the network into clusters, then
slice each cluster into smaller clusters, etc . . . ) can be generalized to less regular topologies.
Indeed, the notion of a correct macro-node (see Definition 3) can be generalized to an
arbitrary graph – the key idea is that, for each interface with another macro-node, we
must still have a 3/4 fraction of reliable nodes. Besides, the network diameter can only have
discrete values here, but we could generalize the result to any network diameter.
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